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Abstract: In this paper we use a stochastic frontier approach to analyse the technical change 
in the post-privatisation period in the gas distribution sector in Argentina. We found that 
there are both a catching up effect and a shift in the frontier that are showing that the sector 
as a whole improved its efficiency in the reviewed period. Moreover, this phenomenon 
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The distribution of natural gas in Argentina began its activity in 1952 with the creation 
of Gas del Estado (GDE). Since the beginning, GDE had the monopoly in all the stages of 
the transport, distribution and marketing of natural gas. This company was privatised in 
1992, being fractionated into two transport and eight distribution companies, which operate 
as geographical natural monopolies. The regulation of the monopolistic stages of the 
industry is defined in the regulatory frame Law 24076 under the supervision of 
ENARGAS, the regulatory agency of the gas sector. 
Behind the privatisation of GDE was the idea that private firms could improve the 
efficiency of the sector. This paper addresses this issue by analysing both technical change 
and catching up effects over the post-privatisation period, 1993-1997. We chose a period of 
five years since privatisation because the industry is regulated with an RPI-X+K 
mechanism with reviews every five years. In that way, we are analysing all the period since 
the privatisation until the first review. 
Gas distribution in Argentina is a regulated activity with companies facing an obligation 
to supply all demand in their concession area. Since production levels are exogenous to the 
firm, the objective function for the firms is to minimise costs subject to achieving an 
exogenously determined product level. Under the prevailing arrangement, the preferred 
model is usually a cost one. However, since there are not regulatory accounting guidelines 
in the sector, the cost comparisons are not always easy. Moreover, current firms did not 
make many of the decisions about capital investments (some investments are mandatory 
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and others were made by GDE) and, therefore, the concept of allocative inefficiency 
becomes diffuse. Finally, though the firms are obliged to supply all demand that is 
connected to the network, they can expand the network in order to increase their demand. 
In that way, demand is not completely exogenous.   
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical structure 
of the production function model estimated. Section 3 presents the data and empirical 
results for the post-privatisation period 1993-1997. Section 4 analyses the returns to scale 
and the overall technical change in the gas distribution sector. Both neutral and non-neutral 
technical changes are considered. Section 5 concludes. 
 
II. The  model 
 
The stochastic frontier production function model with panel data is written as 
Yit = β 0 + X’it β  + ε it, 
where Yit is the output of decision making unit (DMU, hereafter) i (i=1, 2,...,N) at time t 
(t=1,2,...,T), Xit is the corresponding matrix of k inputs and β  is a kX1 vector of unknown 
parameters to be estimated. The error term is specified as 
ε it = vit – uit. 
The vit are statistical noise and are assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed, while uit are non-negative random variables which represent technical 
efficiency. The vit represent those effects that cannot be controlled by the DMU, such as 
measurement errors, omitted variables and weather conditions. Technical efficiency, on the 
other hand, accounts for those factors that can be controlled by the DMU, and can be 
defined as the discrepancy between a DMU’s actual output and its potential output. We use 
the Battese and Coelli (1992) representation for the technical efficiency term: 
uit = exp[-η (t-Ti)]ui    (1), 
where η  is a parameter to be estimated and ui are assumed to be i.i.d. as truncations at 
zero of the N(µ ,σ
2) distribution. The level of technical efficiency of DMU i in period t is 
obtained as 
EFit = exp(-uit). 
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Battese et al. (1992) show that the best predictor of exp(-uit) is obtained by using the 
conditional expectation of exp(-uit) given ε it, E[exp(-uit)/ε it]. 
In this specification, since the exponential function, exp[-η (t-Ti)], has a value of one 
when t=T, the random variable ui can be considered as the technical inefficient effect for 
the i-th DMU in the last period of the panel. For earlier periods, the technical efficiency 
effects are the product of the technical inefficient effect for the i-th DMU in the last period 
of the panel and the value of the exponential function, whose value depends on the 
parameter η  and the number of periods before the last period of the panel. If η  is positive 
then the model shows decreasing inefficiency effects, while if η  is negative the inefficiency 
effects are increasing (Coelli et al. 1998). A disadvantage of this specification is that the 
ordering of the firms according to the magnitude of the technical inefficiency effects is the 
same at all time periods. The main advantage, at least for our purposes, is that the technical 
inefficiency changes over time can be distinguished from technical change. The latter is 
obtained including a time trend (and eventually its square) in the regressor vector. 
It is worthwhile noting that we utilise the parameterisation of Battese et al. (1977) who 
replace  σ v
2
  and σ u
2
  with σ
2=σ v
2
 + σ u
2
 and γ =σ u
2/(σ v
2
 + σ u
2). The parameter γ  must lie 
between zero and one. A value of γ  of zero indicates that the deviations from the frontier 
are due entirely to noise, while a value of one would indicate that all deviations are due to 
technical inefficiency. This specification allows us to test the null hypothesis that there are 
no technical inefficiency effects in the model, H0: γ =0, versus the alternative hypothesis H1: 
γ >0. 
The imposition of one or more restrictions upon this model can provide a number of 
special cases. Setting µ  to be zero reduces to the traditional half-normal model. 
Furthermore, restricting η  to be zero provides the time-invariant model set out in Battese et 
al. (1989). 
In this paper we test the half-normal distribution hypothesis vis a vis the more general 
truncated normal distribution, and we also contrast the hypothesis that the efficiency is time 
invariant. In addition, we test the null that there was no technological change in the five 
year post-privatisation period, 1993-1997.  
   7 
III. Empirical  results 
 
The model presented in section II is used to estimate the production frontier, the time-
varying technical inefficiency and the technical change of the eight geographical natural 
monopolies observed during the first review period.  
The first important decision we have to make was the choice of the variables to include 
in the model. Neuberg (1977) describes four related but distinguishable activities in 
electricity distribution that can be assimilated to the gas case. Firstly, distribution properly 
which includes maintenance of equipment and installations to users and load dispatch. 
Secondly, meter reading and billing. Thirdly, sales including related activities such as 
publicity and fourthly administration. Neuberg suggests four variables as main cost drivers 
in electricity distribution: number of customers served, total KWh sold, Km of distribution 
lines and Km2 of distribution area. Burns et al. (1994) add some additional variables: 
maximum demand (which determines system configuration and size), transform capacity 
(which affects losses) and demand structure (which determines load factors at different 
moments of the day).  
The main conceptual problem is to identify within this set of variables which one or ones 
are the output. Neuberg discards the possibility of treating distribution companies as 
multiproduct firms given that the different variables cannot be separately sold and/or 
priced. For example, once the number of clients is identified as the product (with a price 
equal to average annual revenue per customer of the firm), energy sales in (KWh) cannot be 
sold separately. We follow Neuberg who chooses the number of customers served as the 
relevant output in a single output specification. 
The data set is an unbalanced panel of the eight DMU observed over five years (1993-
97). The information corresponds to December of each year. The set includes information 
about one output, two inputs and three environmental variables. The variables are: number 
of customers (CUSTOM, the output), kilometres of pipes (KMNET, a proxy of capital 
input), number of employees (EMPL, the labour input)
1, concession area (AREA), market 
structure (the ratio of residential sales to total sales, STRUCT) and maximum demand 
(MAXDEM). The last three are environmental variables and are introduced in the model as   8 
firm specific characteristics that allow inter firm comparisons. In this way, a DMU cannot 
appear to be efficient simply by virtue of the fact that its operating environment differs 
widely from that of all the other firms in the sample. The model also includes a time trend.
2  
All of the used data is in the public domain. The number of clients, total sales, 
residential sales and distribution network, were provided by the ENARGAS. Sales are in 
MM m3/day (9300 Kcal). The maximum demand was obtained as the ratio of the month 
with maximum demand to the number of days in that month. The concession area was 
calculated using data provided by INDEC (National Bureau of Statistics). The labour data 
was obtained from the balance sheets of the firms. The omitted data corresponds to number 
of employees of Gasnor and Litoral Gas for 1997 (2 observations). 
The summary statistics of the raw data are presented in table 1 of Appendix. 
We begin the estimations with a flexible model, and we test the different specifications.
3 
First we test the null that the efficiency term has a half-normal distribution. The null that 
the inefficiency effects are time invariant is also tested. In both cases we use a Likelihood 
Ratio (LR) test. This test is based on the log-likelihood functions as follows: 
LR = -2[LR - LU], 
where LR is the log-likelihood of the restricted model and LU is the log-likelihood of the 
unrestricted model. The LR statistic has a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom 
equal to the number of restrictions involved (in our three tests, one).
4 
In a first step we test the null that there are not technical inefficiency effects in the 
model. The log-likelihood function for the maximum likelihood (ML) model is calculated 
to be 78.50, and the value for the ordinary least squares (OLS) fit of the production function 
is 42.17, which is significative less than the former. Since the LR statistic is greater than the 
critical value (one degrees of freedom), the null hypothesis of no technical inefficiency in 
the gas distribution in Argentina is rejected. The ML estimate for γ  is 0.99 with estimated 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
1 A potential problem will arise if some firms subcontract some activities (such as cleaning and maintenance) 
and others not. 
2 Burns et al. (1998) estimate a cost function for the British Gas regions. They include a time trend as a proxy 
for technical progress but they found that it was insignificant. 
3 Since the sample is not large enough, we cannot contrast a Cobb-Douglas versus a translog specification. As 
Coelli et al. note, the translog estimates are likely to suffer from degrees of freedom and multicollinearity 
problems resulting in inefficient estimates. 
4 It must be noted that the critical value for a test of size α  when the null is γ =0 and the alternative is γ >0, is 
equal to the value of the chi-square for a size of 2α .   9 
standard error of 0.0004. These results are consistent with the conclusion that the true γ -
value is concluded to be greater than zero.  
The next step is to test the half-normal model versus the alternative truncated normal. 
The estimated value of µ  is 0.29, and the log likelihood function of the unrestricted model 
is 79.42, which is not significative different from 78.50, the log likelihood of the restricted 
(µ =0) model. Since we cannot reject the null, in the final model the efficiency component is 
assumed to have a half-normal distribution. 
Finally, we test the time invariant inefficiency effect hypothesis. We do so by running 
two models, one with the parameter η  and another without it. The log likelihood of the 
unrestricted model is 91.19, which is significative greater than the log likelihood of the 
restricted (η =0) model. Since the LR test rejects the null H0: η =0, we include η  in the 
model.  
The estimated production function is
5: 
Ln CUSTOM = β 0 + β 1 Ln KMNET + β 2 Ln EMPL + β 3 Ln AREA         (2) 
+ β 4 Ln MAXDEM + β 5 Ln STRUCT + β 6 TIME 
We include a time trend in the model to account for technical change.
6 The specification 
assumes a half-normal distribution of the efficiency effects, and the non-negative random 
variables that represent technical efficiency are assumed to follow the representation shown 
in (1). 
The OLS, COLS (corrected OLS) and ML estimates of the production function are 
presented in table 2 in appendix. 
 
IV.  Returns to scale and technical change 
 
Returns to scale (RTS) are usually calculated from the sum of the inputs’ coefficients as: 
RTS = β 1 + β 2 = 0.248 < 1. 
However, it is sometimes noted that when the model includes environmental variables 
the scale elasticity is given by the proportionate effect on production of changes in the input 
                                                            
5 The computer program FRONTIER 4.1, developed by T. Coelli (1996), is used for estimations. 
6 It is worthwhile noting that in many applications it is included a time trend and its square. This is done when 
the estimated production function is a translog one, in order to provide consistency with the second order 
approximation notion of the translog form.    10
variables and the environmental variables. The main point is that changing the scale of a 
firm would involve changing all of these characteristics of customers and network (Burns et 
al., 1994). In this case,  
RTS = β 1 + β 2 + β 3 + β 4 + β 5 = 0.3488 < 1. 
These results are puzzling, since the industry is usually assumed to have economies (or 
at least constant) of scale. However, it is important to notice that, though in the ML 
specification there are important diseconomies of scale, this is not longer true in the OLS 
model.
7 Why do the OLS model always estimate greater returns to scale than the ML one? 
To answer this question one must recognise that the ML model estimates the slopes 
parameters of the frontier giving more importance to the efficient DMU. OLS, on the other 
hand, estimates these parameters by giving the same weighting to all the observations. 
Since the network investments are sometimes mandatory, it seems natural that the efficient 
firms have inputs elasticities less than the inefficient ones, because these investments are 
not so productive, in terms of new customers, as the investments of the less efficient 
companies. 
The null that there was not technical change is tested using a LR test. We do so by 
running two models, one with time trend and another without time trend. The log likelihood 
of the unrestricted model is estimated to be 91.19, while the restricted model has a log 
likelihood of 89.46. Since the LR test rejects the null H0: t=0, we conclude that there is 
technical change in the post-privatisation period.  
Given the estimated parameters of the ML model, the overall rate of technical change is 
obtained as the derivative of the logarithm of the production function with respect to time, 
dy/dt, which in this case is equal to β 4.
8 
δ  Ln CUSTOM/δ  TIME = 0.0082. 
The above number (0.82%) is interpreted as a constant annual growth rate. The inclusion 
of time in the manner depicted in equation (2) accounts for what is known as Hicks-neutral 
technical change. That is, the functions shift their constant terms but their slopes do not 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
7 In the OLS specification, we cannot rejected the null that β 1 + β 2 = 1. 
8 In a translog specification with time and time square, the neutral technical change is simply dy/dt = β i + 2β jt, 
where β i and β j are the coefficients associated with time and time square, respectively.    11
alter.
9 Non-neutral technical change, on the other hand, can be accounted for by also 
including terms involving the interactions of the inputs and time: 
Ln CUSTOM = β 0 + β 1 Ln KMNET + β 2 Ln EMPL + β 3 Ln AREA + β 4 Ln MAXDEM 
+ β 5 Ln STRUCT + β 6 TIME + β 7 TIME * Ln KMNET  + β 8 TIME * Ln EMPL 
The OLS, COLS and ML estimates of the preferred model are presented in table 3 (see 
Appendix). 
The input elasticities are no longer constant. The output elasticity with respect to labour 
is now  
δ  Ln CUSTOM/δ  Ln EMPL = β 2 + β 8 TIME, 
and the output elasticity with respect to capital is 
δ  Ln CUSTOM/δ  Ln KMNET = β 1 + β 7 TIME. 
Since in the ML preferred model β 7 (β 8) is positive (negative), the elasticity with respect 
to capital (labour) is increasing (decreasing) over time. That is, the capital share is 
increasing. 
The technical change is also analysed from a stochastic parametric Malmquist index 
approach. Estimating stochastic parametric distance functions and Malmquist indices has 
some advantages with respect to deterministic, parametric or non-parametric approaches: 
several hypothesis can be tested, such as statistical significativity of parameters or returns 
to scale. They also present some potential shortcomings, especially if the translog 
specification is used. In this case, regular conditions on the production function are not 
guaranteed and must be checked, especially convexity on outputs and concavity on inputs 
(Fuentes et al., 1998). 
The Malmquist index construction allows us to decompose the secular productivity into 
frontier shifts effects and catching up effects. These indices are calculated using the 
stochastic frontier of section 3, by using the following formulae: 
Efficiency change = EFit/EFis.     (3) 
Since in our preferred model the variables of interaction are significative, we can reject 
the null of neutrality (if we cannot reject the null then the technical change can simply be 
calculated doing the first derivative of the production function with respect to time, at a 
particular data point). In this case, the technical index may vary for different input 
                                                            
9 That is, the marginal rate of technical substitution does not change.   12
vectors.
10 Coelli et al. (1998) suggest that a geometric mean be used to estimate the 
technical change index between adjacent periods s and t. That is, 
Technical change = {[1+ δ f(Xis,τ ,β )/δτ ]× {[1+δ f(Xit,τ ,β )/δτ ]}
0.5.     (4) 
The first derivative is evaluated at τ =s and the second one in τ =t.
11 The indices of 
efficiency change (3) and technical change (4) can be multiplied together to obtain a 
Malmquist index. Table 4 sum up the main results, which are presented in average values 
per year (see Appendix). 
The Malmquist index is on average equal to 1.028. It comes out that over the reviewed 
period the average productivity growth was rather high (almost 3%). The other two 
columns in table 4 allow us to analyse the decomposition of the Malmquist indices: 
technical change is positive, near 2.5% per year, which is combined with a positive rate of 
technical efficiency of about 3.6% per year. That is, in the period reviewed we observe both 





The distribution of natural gas in Argentina was privatised in 1992. Behind the 
privatisation of GDE was the idea that private firms could improve the efficiency of the 
sector. In this paper we use a stochastic frontier approach in order to analyse the technical 
change in this sector in the post-privatisation period. We found that there are both a 
catching up effect and a shift in the frontier that are showing that the sector as a whole 
improved its efficiency in the reviewed period. Moreover, this phenomenon holds not only 
for the average but also for every firm in the sample.  
However, in this paper we just present one approach to the estimation of the technical 
change. In order to make the conclusion more robust, it will be necessary to perform other 
analyses, such as the estimation of a cost frontier and a Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
methodology. NERA (1997), for example, uses a TFP approach to estimate the annual 
                                                            
10 It is worthwhile noting that the annual growth rate is now δ  Ln CUSTOM/δ  TIME = β 6 + β 7 Ln KMNET + 
β 8 Ln EMPL. 
11 f(.) is the production function and τ  is time. 
12 It is worthwhile noting that this catching up effect is observed for every firm and every year of the reviewed 
period.   13
technical change in the gas distribution sector in Argentina in the period 1070-1995.
13 They 
found that the annual TFP measure, using customers as the proxy of output, was 2.38%, a 
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Variable Sample  Mean  Standard  Error 
Number of customers  40  635026  521293 
Km. of network  40  10639  4544 
Number of employees  38  551  338 
Concession area (Km
2) 40  301501  244554 
Residential sales (MM m3/day)  40  1964  1491 
Total gas sold (MM m3/day)  40  8368  4543 
Maximum demand (thousand of m3)  40  9417  5307 
   15
 
Table 2 
Production function estimates 
 
Variable OLS  COLS  ML 
Constant  6.14 (13.70)  6.22  11.55 (23.21) 
Ln EMPL  0.54 (7.05)  0.54  0.22 (4.42) 
Ln KMNET  0.37 (6.50)  0.37  0.028 (1.08) 
Ln AREA  -0.16 (-12.12)  -0.16  0.018 (0.35) 
Ln MAXDEM  0.14 (4.74)  0.14  0.039 (2.08) 
Ln STRUCT  -0.16 (-3.72)  -0.16  0.043 (2.47) 
TIME 0.0037  (0.32) 0.0037 0.0082  (2.90) 
γ    0.8500  0.9999  (78053.50) 
η      0.0175  (5.87) 
Log-likelihood 42.17    91.19 
Between parentheses are presented the t-statistics. Ln stands for natural logarithm. 
   16
Table 3 
OLS, COLS and ML estimates of the preferred model 
 
Variable OLS  COLS  ML 
Constant  6.45 (11.02)  6.54   13.31 (31.21) 
Ln KMNET  0.51 (4.59)  0.51  0.18 (3.87) 
Ln EMPL  0.42 (3.28)  0.42  0.096 (4.22) 
Ln AREA  -0.15 (–10.78)  -0.15  -0.18 (-28.72) 
Ln MAXDEM  0.092 (1.48)  0.092  0.008 (0.32) 
Ln STRUCT  -0.16 (-3.73)  -0.16  -0.0073 (-0.52) 
TIME  -0.0189 (–0.73)  -0.0189  -0.017 (-2.35) 
TIME * Ln KMNET  -0.0046 (-0.20)  -0.0046  0.022 (7.48) 
TIME * Ln EMPL  0.011 (0.34)  0.011  -0.026 (-5.79) 
γ    0.8500  0.9998  (16520.6) 
η      0.0077  (1.84) 
Log-likelihood 42.71    102.59 
Between parentheses are presented the t-statistics. Ln denotes natural logarithm. 
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Table 4 
Technical efficiency and  
Malmquist index decomposition 
Average values* 
 
Year  Efficiency Change  Technical Change  Malmquist Index 
1994  1.003827 1.023439 1.027355 
1995  1.003797 1.024589 1.028480 
1996  1.003768 1.025357 1.029220 
1997  1.003146 1.024872 1.028096 
Geometric  Mean  1.003634 1.024564 1.028287 
Standard  Deviation  0.000326 0.000814 0.000777 
*Geometric means. Since the information is from December of each year, there are not 
estimations for 1993.   18
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